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T. A. Cavanaugh, Philosophy, University of San Francisco 
Penultimate version, Act-Evaluation, Willing, and Double Effect, American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 71, 1997, pp. 243-253. 
 
ACT-EVALUATION, WILLING, AND DOUBLE EFFECT 
 
Theorists of common morality, deontologists, virtue ethicists, and absolutists understand 
differences in an agent's volitional states to influence the ethical evaluation of actions.
i
 Amongst 
other positions, such thinkers understand there to be an important ethical difference between acts 
of intentional harming and acts that cause harm as a foreseen but not intended concomitant. For 
example, such thinkers contrast tactical bombing that kills non-combatants as a side-effect of 
destroying a legitimate military target with terror bombing that kills non-combatants as a means 
to achieving victory. Many virtue ethicists, deontologists, and absolutists hold that, other things 
being equal -- for example, the magnitude and probability of the harm --  tactical bombing is 
more easily justified than terror bombing. This position is often articulated in terms of what is 
commonly referred to as the “principle,” “rule,” or “doctrine” of double effect and which I shall 
henceforth call “double-effect reasoning” or “DER.” 
 Double-effect reasoning concerns acts that both have legitimate goals and cause 
side-effects that ought to be avoided.
ii
 DER presupposes that there is an ethically important 
difference between what one knowingly and willingly causes as a means or end and what one 
knowingly and willingly causes as a concomitant of what one knowingly and willingly causes as 
a means or end. This is often called the intended/foreseen distinction or the intention/foresight 
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distinction. However, it is not so much a distinction between volitional and epistemic states -- as 
“intended/foreseen” implies -- as it is a distinction between different volitional dispositions 
towards states of affairs that result from an agent’s action or omission. Giving this distinction 
moral weight in one’s evaluation of acts amounts to holding that differences in volition -- 
specifically the differences between willing harm as an end or means and willing harm as a 
concomitant of what one wills as an end or means -- ground differences in the evaluation of 
acts.
iii
 
 Some recent thinkers, however, hold that volitional states lack relevance in act-evaluation 
or what is often called “first-order morality,” while holding that if volitional states have 
relevance, it is to be found in the evaluation of agents, or “second-order morality.”iv These 
thinkers separate the ethical assessment of actions from the evaluation of agents as responsible 
for acts and as good or bad agents. Accordingly, they understand there to be a significant gap 
between the criteria for evaluating an action and those for evaluating an agent. One might hold, 
for example, that while terror bombing is, other things being equal -- e.g., the number of deaths 
one causes -- no worse than tactical bombing, the terror bomber might be worse than the tactical 
bomber. One might think that the terror bomber is worse, not because he does something worse, 
but because he is, at least proximately, motivated by something worse -- the deaths and terror of 
non-combatants --  than what motivates the tactical bomber: the destruction of a military 
installation.
v
 More generally, the position comes to holding that acts are to be judged good or 
bad without reference to the agent’s epistemic and volitional states while agents are to be judged 
responsible and good or bad partially in terms of their epistemic and volitional states. Those who 
think that DER mistakenly contrasts acts such as terror and tactical bombing often hold that it 
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conflates act-evaluation with agent-assessment, or the first and second orders of morality. Thus, 
the position that the first-order second-order distinction marks a gap between act-evaluations 
which do not refer to agent’s mental states and agent-evaluations which do, is of interest insofar 
as it bears on the debate concerning the ethical relevance of belief and volition in act-evaluation 
and the tenability of DER. 
 In what follows, I have two goals: first, the destructive goal of articulating and criticizing 
the first-order second-order distinction understood dichotomously. Second, the constructive goal 
of arguing that differences in volitional states are relevant to act-assessment insofar as volitional 
states partially constitute an action and themselves admit of important differences. If successful, 
I will have shown the tenability of DER insofar as it presupposes that there is an ethically 
significant difference between, for example, the different volitional states that constitute terror 
and tactical bombing. First, I present a brief account of what constitutes a human action. 
THE HUMAN ACTION 
 Amongst other matters, ethics concerns the goodness and badness of both what humans 
believingly  and willingly cause -- actions -- and what humans believingly and willingly do not 
cause -- omissions. In short, ethics concentrates on the voluntary. By “believing willing” causing 
I mean a human being causing something voluntarily, which would exclude what is not up to 
him to cause and what he causes either in inculpable ignorance or by force. An agent is culpably 
ignorant if he does not know what he can know but knowingly and willingly chooses not to 
know. For example, if Joe finds a wallet full of money and chooses not to investigate whose 
wallet he has found, he is voluntarily and thereby culpably ignorant of whose money he takes. 
Moreover, an agent is culpable for her ignorance if she does not know something she can know 
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and has the responsibility to know. For example, if Mary is a physician, she has the 
responsibility to know if her patient is allergic to penicillin before she administers it. The 
obligation to know is voluntary insofar as it attends her voluntarily being a doctor. 
 Ethics is bounded by the voluntary, what humans believingly and willingly cause and 
what they believingly and willingly do not cause. This is morality’s breadth, extension, or 
territory. In order for something to be considered within ethics, it must fall within the boundaries 
constituted by belief and volition. In the final section of this paper, I will argue that morality also 
has a depth which volition establishes and demarcates. It is in terms of this depth that different 
acts which bring about the same consequences can be contrasted with one another as better and 
worse, more and less easily justified. Before doing this I will present and articulate what has 
come to be called the “first-order second-order distinction” as some understand it to mark a gap 
between act- evaluation and agent-evaluation. 
DONAGAN 
 Alan Donagan proposes what he himself calls "first-order moral questions"  which 
concern actions as "permissible or impermissible" and "second-order moral questions" which 
concern "questions about the culpability or inculpability of agents".
vi
 He describes this 
distinction, saying: 
The distinction between first-order and second-order moral questions is 
related to a distinction ... between actions considered materially and 
actions considered formally. Considered materially, an action is a deed, 
and no reference is made to the doer's state of mind in doing it. Thus, an 
action is material stealing, or materially considered is stealing, if it is the 
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forcible or surreptitious taking of what belongs to somebody else. 
Considered formally, an action is what its doer wills to do in doing it. 
Hence an action which materially is stealing may not be so formally, 
because the stealer may honestly believe that what he is taking is his own 
property.
vii
 
According to Donagan, first-order morality considers effects attributable to an agent without 
reference to the agent's epistemic and volitional states. Second-order morality considers the 
agent's mental states regarding actions evaluated in first-order morality. He understands 
first-order morality to concern actions insofar as they are the effects of human beings as causes, 
not insofar as they are agent or believing willing causes. 
 Donagan holds that an action considered materially has no reference to the agent's beliefs 
or wants. Yet, to consider an action materially is to consider an action. When one considers an 
action, one -- at least implicitly -- considers a believing willing causing. Of course, one can ask 
whether what an agent does is permissible or impermissible without asking, for example, why he 
does it. Nonetheless, to ask whether what an agent does is permissible or impermissible requires 
a reference to his epistemic and volitional states which states either establish his responsibility 
for a specific act or indicate that no action occurred. 
 If one can evaluate an action without reference to an agent's mental states, there would 
seem to be a substantial gap between the criteria in terms of which one evaluates an action and 
the conditions establishing an agent's responsibility. In fact, this is Donagan's position, as he 
states: 
Our analysis has shown that a prescription that somebody not do an action 
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of a certain kind does not entail a prescription that he be blamed if he does 
it. A deed may be impermissible, and yet its doer be inculpable; and a doer 
may be culpable even though his deed is permissible.
viii
 
Donagan presents two kinds of cases: first, an agent inculpably doing an impermissible deed; 
second, an agent culpably doing a permissible deed. 
 Concerning the first case, one can cause something bad that would be impermissible to 
cause if one were to cause it voluntarily. For example, if in inculpable ignorance I ruin your 
freshly-poured concrete driveway, you can say "if he had ruined the driveway voluntarily, it 
would have been wrong." However, to say "if one were voluntarily to , it would be wrong" is 
not to speak about ing without reference to an agent's epistemic and volitional states, for ‘it’ 
refers to ing voluntarily or believingly willingly ing. One could say the same thing more 
exactly by saying: ing voluntarily -- which is the only way one can  -- is wrong. 
 As Anscombe says: 
A rule as you consider it in deciding to obey or disobey it does not run: do 
not voluntarily do such-and-such, for you cannot consider whether to do 
such-and-such voluntarily or not. ... Voluntariness is presupposed in [the 
person's] considering whether to do [such-and-such]. Thus it does not 
come into his considerations of what to do.
ix
 
Morality's threshold is the voluntary; thus, once inside morality, we attend, implicitly or 
explicitly, to the voluntary. My inculpably ruining your driveway is like a tree's doing so: it is 
not voluntary. My doing so, however, is more easily conflated with my voluntarily and wrongly 
doing so because while both a tree and I can ruin your driveway, only I can voluntarily ruin it. 
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 The second case Donagan mentions concerns an agent being culpable although his deed 
is permissible. For example, giving food to a hungry person is permissible. Yet, I am blamed if 
the reason I did it was to get the hungry man to commit a crime. I am not blamed for the 
permissible act, however. For, conceptually, if one performs a permissible deed one cannot be to 
blame for it insofar as it is permissible. Thus, in the two types of acts that Donagan describes, it 
is conceptually the case that one cannot blame an agent for an act that is permissible nor can one 
hold that an agent’s act was impermissible while asserting that he was not to blame. In short, the 
criteria of act-evaluation cannot be entirely divorced from the criteria in terms of which agents 
are responsible for acts. 
 Once one acknowledges that an act, because it is a believing willing causing, cannot be 
evaluated without reference to an agent’s epistemic and volitional states and that these states 
establish an agent’s responsibility for the act, then the putative gap between act and 
agent-evaluation closes, at least with respect to the evaluation of an agent as responsible for an 
act. When understood as marking a dichotomy, the first-order second-order distinction faces a 
conceptually insuperable difficulty: speaking of an action without reference to an agent’s 
epistemic and volitional states. 
BENNETT 
 Donagan is not alone in understanding the first-order second-order distinction as marking 
a dichotomy. Jonathan Bennett explicitly follows Donagan's account of this distinction. 
According to Bennett, first-order morality is entirely divorced from a consideration of the 
mental states of agents. He says: 
The meanings of the transitive verbs in our standard repertoire [of 
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first-order morality] are silent about what agent knew or wanted, and 
therefore about what he intended; so the source of an emphasis on 
intention must be sought elsewhere.
x
 
According to Bennett, since first-order morality makes no reference to an agent's mental states, 
intention cannot bear on act-evaluation. He holds that if intention has significance it would be in 
agent-assessment.
xi
 
 What are the transitive verbs of which Bennett speaks? He gives as examples “‘hurt’, 
‘help’, ‘betray’, ‘reward’, and ‘harm’."xii Thus, according to Bennett, to say "I hurt him" is to 
remain silent about what I knew or wanted. Following Austin, a plea for excuses is in order. 
Bennett's position seems to be that the only excuse to the accusation of hurting, for example, 
would be to say "it did not really hurt" -- which will probably add insult to injury. That is, the 
only excuse would be to comment on resulting states of affairs, never to refer to mental states. 
Yet, to an accusation of hurting the accused might respond: "I did not know that it hurt" or "I 
knew, but I did not want to hurt you." The accuser implies that the transitive verb applies. The 
excuser can assert that it does not apply because he did not know, and, therefore, as described, 
that action did not occur. Or, he can assert that he knew but did not want to hurt, and, therefore, 
‘hurting’ is not an entirely appropriate description insofar as it implies that he sought to cause the 
harm. 
 The accused is not mistaken to focus on his epistemic and volitional states in responding 
to the accusations. For the transitive verbs of common morality are not silent about agent's 
epistemic and volitional states. They are, however, at times vague and ambiguous insofar as I can 
cause you harm without believing or wanting. Yet, to cause you harm without believing that 
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what I cause is harmful is not an act of hurting. In fact, to cause some upshot without thinking 
will at times not be to act at all, for example, if while asleep I roll over and hurt you. Moreover, 
to cause you pain, for example, without willing to is not to hurt you, at least in one sense of 
‘hurting’. For example, if I am a physician and the shot I give you hurts, I may note that although 
I knew that it would hurt, that was not my goal. I concede that I caused you pain and to that 
extent ‘hurt’ you, but I deny that I ‘hurt’ you insofar as ‘hurting’ implies wanting to hurt. 
 If you accept excuses that refer to my beliefs and desires then you understand the 
transitive verb to refer to my epistemic and volitional states -- amongst other things. Since 
ordinary users of ordinary language do accept such excuses we have reason to hold that the 
transitive verbs of morality are not silent about what agent knew or wanted, and, therefore, are 
not silent about what he intended. Attention to belief and desire -- and, thereby, to intention -- 
appears appropriate in act-evaluation. 
THE ERROR 
 Why think that one could evaluate an action without referring to the agent's epistemic and 
volitional states? There is one very good reason -- the "ontological reason." States of affairs are 
objectively good or bad. For example, a hungry person's having food is good. Of course, to hold 
this we need not refer to any agent's beliefs or desires about the hungry having food. Indeed, the 
goodness of states of affairs such as the goodness of the hungry having food causes us to have 
beliefs and desires about the goodness and desirability of the hungry having food. If I walk down 
the street with a bag full of bagels and, without my knowing or willing it, one falls out and rolls 
down the sidewalk to a homeless hungry man, this is good. I, however, am not involved as an 
agent. The bagel's rolling down the sidewalk is not an act of mine, for it is not an act. 
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Nonetheless, it might be good insofar as it brings about the hungry man's being fed. To say that it 
is good, regardless of my beliefs and desires, that the bagel rolls down the sidewalk to the hungry 
man, is not to say that there is some action which can be evaluated as good without reference to 
my beliefs and desires. The error -- the "ontological fallacy" -- occurs in thinking that one can 
speak of actions as being ethically good or bad without reference to an agent's beliefs and 
desires. One might -- mistakenly -- think this insofar as without reference to an agent's beliefs 
and desires one can speak of good and bad states of affairs that if caused believingly and 
willingly would partially constitute actions as ethically good or bad. However, if the condition of 
being caused voluntarily is not fulfilled, one cannot speak of these good and bad states of affairs 
as being ethically good or bad, permissible or impermissible acts. 
THE ETHICAL RELEVANCE OF VOLITIONAL STATES 
 I have argued that insofar as an action is a believing willing causing, when one speaks of 
an action one must refer to an agent's beliefs and volitions, if only implicitly. Moreover, I have 
argued that insofar as one must refer to an agent’s mental states in act-evaluation and these states 
establish an agent’s responsibility, act-evaluation cannot be divorced from a corresponding 
assessment of an agent as responsible. I now want to argue that since an action is a believing 
willing causing, insofar as willing admits of important differences, act-evaluations should take 
into account these differences. I will focus on three distinct volitional states: willing something 
as an end, for its own sake; willing something as a means, as ordered to the realization of one’s 
end; and willing something as a concomitant either of one’s end or of one’s means. That is, to 
will something as a concomitant or side-effect is to will it neither as one’s end nor as ordered to 
the realization of one’s end, but to will it solely as an associate of one’s end or means. These 
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three states relate to one another causally. 
 What one wills as an end determines what one wills as a means. For example, if I want to 
catch fish, I must employ some means of doing so: a net; a rod, reel and lure; or a grenade. It is 
my wanting to catch fish that leads me to want to use this lure and this pole. What one wills as an 
end may also cause one to will something else as a concomitant. For example, my wanting to 
catch fish may also cause me to bring a good fishing spot to the notice of other fishermen. Thus, 
my end determines what I will as a means and sometimes it directly determines what I will as a 
concomitant. Similarly, what one wills as a means sometimes itself directly determines what one 
wills as a concomitant. For example, in using a lure, I may snag the bottom or some seaweed, 
whereas if I used a net or a grenade, I would not. Of course, using such means to catch fish 
involves other concomitants. Thus, both what one wills as a means and what one wills as an end 
at times determine what one wills as a concomitant. What one wills as a concomitant, however, 
does not determine what one wills as an end or as a means. To speak in terms of depth or 
intensity, to will something as an end is to will it most deeply or most intensely; to will 
something as a means is to will it with less depth or intensity than what causes one to will it as a 
means; and, to will something as a concomitant is to will it with the least depth or intensity, or to 
will it most superficially. 
 Insofar as an action is constituted by what an agent believingly and willingly causes, and 
insofar as willing admits of these three distinct depths or intensities, the goodness and badness of  
actions that cause consequentially similar states of affairs to obtain will vary partly in accordance 
with the different volitional states that constitute the different actions. That is, other things being 
equal, an action that brings about a bad state of affairs as an end is worse than one that brings 
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that bad state of affairs about as a means. An action that brings that bad state of affairs about as a 
concomitant is not as bad as the actions that bring it about as an end or as a means. In short, 
goodness and badness of acts vary in part with the depth or intensity with which good and bad 
states of affairs are willed such that the more deeply or more intensely some good or bad state 
of affairs is willed, the better or the worse the action. For the action is in part that depth or 
intensity of willing that good or bad state of affairs. 
 For example, the tactical bomber would rather cause the deaths of the non-combatants 
than forgo destroying the military installation. He wants their deaths as a concomitant. This 
wanting of their deaths derives entirely from his wanting to destroy the military installation as an 
end and nothing derives from his wanting their deaths. For example, he does not choose some 
type of bomb in order to kill the non-combatants. The willing of non-combatant deaths partially 
constituting tactical bombing is not as deep as the willing of non-combatant deaths that 
constitutes terror bombing. Willing terror and non-combatant deaths as means to the end of 
victory constitute terror bombing. The prospect of non-combatant deaths and terror causes and 
defines terror bombing. Of course, the goals of terror and non-combatant deaths do not 
ultimately or solely cause terror bombing. Ultimately, like tactical bombing, terror bombing 
occurs for the sake of winning the war. Nonetheless, proximately, terror bombing instantiates a 
more intense wanting of  terror and non-combatant deaths than does tactical bombing. 
Accordingly, other things being equal, terror bombing is worse than tactical bombing. 
 If there were some third type of bombing the goal of which were solely to kill and 
terrorize non-combatants -- call it “punitive bombing” -- this would surely be worse than both 
terror and tactical bombing.
xiii
 But why? Other things being equal, it cannot be worse in terms of 
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its consequences. It is worse -- and, the worst kind of bombing -- because it instantiates the 
deepest level of volitional commitment to something bad. For in punitive bombing the terror and 
deaths of the non-combatants are ends in themselves, sought for their own sake. Other things 
being equal, punitive bombing is worse than terror bombing and terror bombing is worse than 
tactical bombing. These comparative relationships hold insofar as these acts instantiate willings 
that vary in depth or intensity. In short, different volitional attitudes towards consequentially 
similar resulting states of affairs make for differences in act-evaluation or in first-order morality. 
 As we have seen, however, this position is controverted. For example, Jonathan Bennett 
says: 
[I]f a first-order morality's basic concern is to oppose behaviour that has 
relational property RP, that does not give it a derivative concern with 
beliefs about or attitudes towards RP. For example, a morality's having a 
basic concern with the causing of pain does not give it a derivative 
concern with beliefs about the causing of pain. Such beliefs are relevant to 
judgements in the associated second-order morality, but not to first-order 
judgements of wrongness.
xiv
 
 According to Bennett, if some ethic were to oppose the causing of pain, it should not 
have any concern about an agent’s volitional states concerning the causing of pain in the 
assessment of an action because volitional states are not relevant in act-evaluation. Thus, 
differences in volitional states would not be relevant in the evaluation of acts, although they 
might be relevant in the evaluation of agents, according to Bennett. Yet, in an ethic 
fundamentally opposed to causing pain, causing pain just for the sake of causing pain would be 
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the worst act because to want something for its own sake is to want it most completely and 
deeply. Therefore, an act instantiating the willing as an end of what ought to be avoided is most 
deeply wrong. This truth cannot be captured, however, if first-order morality consists only of 
what an agent believingly and willingly brings about without reference to distinct volitional 
states. For to bring something about as an end, or as a means, or as a side-effect is to bring it 
about voluntarily or believingly and willingly. If one does not contrast these distinct volitional 
states that partially constitute actions, then one’s act-evaluations remain superficial insofar as 
they cannot attend to the depth or intensity of which volition admits. 
 One who holds that differences in willing do not make for  differences in 
act-assessments must explain why ethics is demarcated in terms of believing and willing and yet 
the variations of which willing admits make no difference in act-assessment. For example, ethics 
has little to say if I harm or help you in inculpable ignorance or by force and without willing to 
(say someone pushes me into you). Yet, ethics has much to say if I believingly and willingly 
harm or help you. It is puzzling to hold that harm or benefit coming about in accordance with 
belief and volition has fundamental importance in ethics -- by establishing that an action 
occurred -- while holding that further differences of which willing admits make no difference at 
all in act-evaluation. Such a position is out of step with ethic's central concern with what humans 
believingly and willingly cause and with what humans believingly and willingly do not cause. 
Just as the goodness and badness of resulting states of affairs partially constitute moral goodness 
and badness insofar as agents believingly and willingly cause those states of affairs, so also the 
intensities or depths of which willing admits (as an end, as a means, or as a concomitant) 
establish differences in act-evaluation. Thus, actions are better or worse, permissible or 
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impermissible partially in terms of these different volitional states. 
 I have argued a number of points. First, insofar as epistemic and volitional states 
constitute actions and establish an agent’s responsibility for actions so constituted, act-evaluation 
and the evaluation of an agent as responsible cannot come apart. Second, insofar as willing 
partially constitutes an action, and itself admits of three distinct intensities or depths, 
act-evaluations must take into account these different depths instantiated in consequentially 
similar acts. If the above arguments stand, act-evaluations and assessments of agents as 
responsible ought to be understood as integrated with one another, not as dichotomous. 
Moreover, act assessments ought to reflect the various depths of which volition admits, as, for 
example, double effect reasoning does. 
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